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SYMPOSIUM
MOORE KINSHIP
FOREWORD
R.A. Lenhardt* & Clare Huntington**
Forty years ago, Mrs. Inez Moore, a widowed black mother and
grandmother of little means, secured a victory that likely seemed
improbable to many. Without any money, but with the assistance of a team
of dedicated Legal Aid attorneys,1 she took her lawsuit challenging an East
Cleveland, Ohio, zoning ordinance that made it a crime for her to live with
her grandson all the way to the U.S. Supreme Court and won.2 The
ordinance permitted certain extended family configurations to reside
together within the city’s limits, but it prohibited Inez’s family
arrangement.3 Just by bringing her infant grandson John Jr., upon his
mother’s death, to live in the home in which she already resided with her
son, Dale Sr., and his minor son, Dale Jr., Inez ran afoul of a housing code
provision that local officials vigorously enforced.4 For her refusal to heed
their demands that she basically evict John Jr. from the only home he had
ever known, Inez faced not only a criminal fine but jail time as well.5
Moore v. City of East Cleveland,6 the Supreme Court decision
vindicating Inez’s right to raise her grandson in her home has become a
mainstay in all major family law casebooks. Indeed, it stands as one of the
most important family law judgments ever rendered by the Court. In
finding that East Cleveland’s ordinance violated the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause, the Court affirmed the constitutional
importance of families and decision making pertaining to issues such as
* Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law; Faculty Director, Center on Race,
Law, and Justice. This Foreword provides an overview of the Fordham Law Review Family
Law Symposium entitled Moore Kinship held at Fordham University School of Law.
** Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Research, Fordham University School of Law.
1. See CAROL POH MILLER, A PASSION FOR JUSTICE: A HISTORY OF THE LEGAL AID
SOCIETY OF CLEVELAND 1905–2005, at 62–63 (2006); Peggy Cooper Davis, Moore v. East
Cleveland: Constructing the Suburban Family, in FAMILY LAW STORIES 77, 78 (Carol
Sanger ed., 2008).
2. See generally Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
3. See id. at 495–96.
4. See id. at 496–97.
5. See id. at 497.
6. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
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marriage and childrearing.7 Justice Lewis Powell, who wrote the plurality
opinion in Moore, concluded that the ordinance simply “slic[ed] [too]
deeply into the family itself.”8 Justice Powell explained that due process
protections for family relationships are not limited to nuclear families.9
Instead, such protections encompass extended families, which Justice
Powell and those who joined him recognized as having a long “tradition” in
the United States “equally deserving of constitutional recognition.”10
The Fordham Law Review elected to mark the fortieth anniversary of the
decision in Moore by convening a group of family law scholars to reflect on
both what Moore meant for families and family law at the time it was
decided and what it means today. Moore’s treatment of extended families
ensures its mention in most conversations about alternative family forms.
Yet, there are many ways in which Moore, notwithstanding its broad
endorsement of familial privacy and protection, represents a missed
opportunity. It makes no mention, for example, of family structures less
rooted in tradition, such as those involving nonmarital unions and
childrearing. Nor does it address the race and socioeconomic issues that
seem to have informed the City of East Cleveland’s actions. The
challenged ordinance was designed to stave off white flight and manage an
influx of African American residents,11 but archival documents relevant to
the decision make it clear that Justice Powell was determined to avoid any
mention of race in rendering the Court’s judgment.12 Indeed, Moore
studiously avoids grappling with any of the hard issues pertaining to race,
equality, and family formation.13
The Court’s decision, which has largely been overlooked as a subject of
scholarly examination, offers an important starting point for a deeper
examination of the role of the law in both supporting and, too often,
undermining families, especially families of color. In 2017, more families
than ever do not fit the traditional model of a married man and woman

7. See id. at 504–06.
8. Id. at 498.
9. Id. at 504.
10. Id.
11. See Davis, supra note 1, at 84.
12. See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, No. 75-6289, draft op. at 1 (U.S. Feb. 14,
1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (containing, in the margin of Justice Brennan’s thendissenting opinion, a handwritten note from Justice Powell stating, “I see no racial overtones
here”). By contrast, Justice William Brennan’s concurrence, joined by Justice Thurgood
Marshall, does acknowledge this element of the case. See Moore, 431 U.S. at 508–10
(Brennan, J., concurring) (“In today’s America, the ‘nuclear family’ is the pattern so often
found in much of white suburbia. The Constitution cannot be interpreted, however, to
tolerate the imposition by government upon the rest of us of white suburbia’s preference in
patterns of family living. . . . The ‘extended’ form is especially familiar among black
families. . . . [T]he prominence of other than nuclear families among ethnic and racial
minority groups, including our black citizens, surely demonstrates that the ‘extended family’
pattern remains a vital tenet of our society.” (citation and footnote omitted)).
13. For an article discussing the problems inherent in case law and scholarship that fail
to attend to the operation of race in the family context, see R.A. Lenhardt, The Color of
Kinship, 102 IOWA L. REV. (forthcoming 2017).
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raising biological or adoptive children. Today, far fewer adults marry.14
Approximately forty percent of children are born to unmarried parents,15
the majority of whom will not marry.16 Same-sex couples abound and are
raising children together.17 And familial roles and caretaking norms are
increasingly fluid, with men providing significant amounts of care and
women acting as the sole or primary breadwinner.18
As at the time of Moore, family structure in 2017 differs by race and
class. The marriage rate has declined for all groups, but it has dropped
disproportionately for adults of color.19 All racial and economic groups
have children outside of marriage, but nonmarital children are
disproportionately of color.20 LGBT couples of all races raise children, but
these families are disproportionately of color.21 And income inequality is
not equal. The median wealth of white households is thirteen times the
median wealth of black households and ten times the median wealth of
Latino households.22
The symposium on Moore that the Law Review hosted and that
Fordham’s new Center on Race, Law, and Justice cosponsored was
designed to grapple with these and other issues facing modern families. It
began with a keynote address by Anne Williams-Isom, chief executive
14. See PEW RESEARCH CTR., THE DECLINE OF MARRIAGE AND RISE OF NEW FAMILIES 1
(2010), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/files/2010/11/pew-social-trends-2010-families.pdf
[http://perma.cc/DD83-6PHG].
15. See BRADY E. HAMILTON ET AL., CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, U.S.
DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., BIRTHS: PRELIMINARY DATA FOR 2015, at 4 (2016),
https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr65/nvsr65_03.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q8V8-7TW7].
16. See Sara S. McLanahan & Irwin Garfinkel, Fragile Families: Debates, Facts, and
Solutions, in MARRIAGE AT THE CROSSROADS: LAW, POLICY, AND THE BRAVE NEW WORLD OF
TWENTY-FIRST-CENTURY FAMILIES 142, 147 (Marsha Garrison & Elizabeth S. Scott eds.,
2012).
17. See GARY J. GATES, WILLIAMS INST., LGBT PARENTING IN THE UNITED STATES 1
(2013), https://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/LGBT-Parenting.pdf (“An
estimated 3 million LGBT Americans have had a child and as many as 6 million American
children and adults have an LGBT parent.”) [https://perma.cc/RZK5-GM6K].
18. See KIM PARKER & WENDY WANG, PEW RESEARCH CTR., MODERN PARENTHOOD:
ROLES OF MOMS AND DADS CONVERGE AS THEY BALANCE WORK AND FAMILY 1 (2013),
http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/files/2013/03/FINAL_modern_parenthood_03-2013.pdf
(describing this trend) [https://perma.cc/6J78-WHDX]; WENDY WANG ET AL., PEW
RESEARCH CTR., BREADWINNER MOMS: MOTHERS ARE THE SOLE OR PRIMARY PROVIDER IN
FOUR-IN-TEN HOUSEHOLDS WITH CHILDREN; PUBLIC CONFLICTED ABOUT THE GROWING
TREND 20 (2013), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/files/2013/05/Breadwinner_moms_
final.pdf [https://perma.cc/RF4C-6Y68].
19. See R.A. Lenhardt, Marriage as Black Citizenship?, 66 HASTINGS L.J. 1317, 1345–
46 (2015).
20. See HAMILTON ET AL., supra note 15, at 4.
21. See GATES, supra note 17, at 1 (“An estimated 39% of individuals in same-sex
couples who have children under age 18 in the home are people of color, compared to 36%
of those in different-sex couples who are non-White. Among children under 18 living with
same-sex couples, half (50%) are non-White compared to 41% of children living with
different-sex couples.”).
22. See Rakesh Kochhar & Richard Fry, Wealth Inequality Has Widened Along Racial,
Ethnic Lines Since End of Great Recession, PEW RES. CTR.: FACT TANK (Dec. 12, 2014),
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/12/12/racial-wealth-gaps-great-recession/
[https://perma.cc/3TCC-8J3B].
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officer of the Harlem Children’s Zone. Williams-Isom described how she
saw grandmothers working, as Inez Moore did, to strengthen their extended
families.23 Referring to the Harlem Children’s Zone, Williams-Isom
described how extended family is what they do—it’s who they are.24 But
she also talked about the need to support these families and the many ways
the government often fails to do so.25 Her appreciation for both the
strengths of extended families, as well as the significant challenges they
face, is reflected throughout the symposium articles.
Later, in a series of roundtables, the participants explored the meaning of
Moore—what was won and what was lost—talked about where we stand
now, and debated how to move toward a more inclusive family law, by both
setting objectives and also identifying constraints and possibilities. Out of
these roundtables, many participants chose to write articles for this issue.26
Together, these articles help to deepen the scholarly analysis of Moore and
to explicate the kinds of issues and concerns that are—or should be—at the
heart of research concerning the family today.
Unsurprisingly, given the circumstances that gave rise to the Moore case,
as well as the national conversation about race and inequality that has
unfolded in the wake of the tragic deaths in Baltimore, New York City, and
elsewhere,27 a number of the articles included here focus on issues of race
and the effects of structural inequality on families of color in particular. In
addition to the article by Anne Williams-Isom, which underscores the
themes outlined in her keynote, several articles look to interrogate the
systems and structures that account for the aforementioned racial disparities
in the lives and functioning of families today. For example, Angela
Onwuachi-Willig looks at the operation of race in Justice William
Brennan’s oft-celebrated concurrence in Moore that, unlike Justice Powell’s
opinion, at least acknowledges how race informs African American kinship
structures.28 She argues that, despite this acknowledgement, Justice
Brennan’s concurrence works to stigmatize black extended families like
Inez Moore’s as a second-best alternative.29 Thus, Onwuachi-Willig urges
an alternate approach, one that regards extended families as a truly

23. See Anne Williams-Isom, Introduction: Moore v. City of East Cleveland: How One
Grandmother Helped a Nation Redefine Family, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 2559, 2559 (2017).
24. Id.
25. See id. at 2561–62.
26. The family law scholars who participated in the symposium were Tonya Brito,
Naomi Cahn, Ann Cammett, June Carbone, Nancy Dowd, Maxine Eichner, Elizabeth
Emens, Serena Mayeri, Camille Gear Rich, Clare Huntington, Holning Lau, Robin Lenhardt,
Kevin Nobel Maillard, Solangel Maldonado, Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Amber ShanahanFricke, and Anne Williams-Isom.
27. See Lenhardt, supra note 13, at 5–8; see also Lydia Polgreen, From Ferguson to
Charleston and Beyond, Anguish About Race Keeps Building, N.Y. TIMES (June 20, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/21/us/from-ferguson-to-charleston-and-beyond-anguishabout-race-keeps-building.html [https://perma.cc/E23P-C2RM].
28. See Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Extending the Normativity of the Extended Family:
Reflections on Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 2655 (2017); see also
supra note 12.
29. See Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 28, at 2656.
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exemplary family form, providing family members with tremendous social
and economic support as well as a deep-seated sense of belonging.30
Similarly, Solangel Maldonado and Ann Cammett urge greater
attentiveness to processes and policies that lock families of color into
inequality31 and compromise the capacity of their members to flourish.32
Maldonado emphasizes that, notwithstanding the outcome in Moore, local
zoning ordinances continue to structure community life in ways that
exclude and greatly disadvantage extended families.33 She urges greater
attention to local provisions that limit two-family homes as a way of
Such
controlling noise and overcrowding, among other things.34
regulations, Maldonado explains, have a disparate and stigmatizing effect
on immigrants and families of color, as they are more likely than their
nonimmigrant and white counterparts to reside in such homes and to reside
in extended family households.35
Ann Cammett, for her part, considers the challenges that women like Inez
Moore face today if they try to offer housing to family members with a
criminal record.36 Today, renters in this context face certain restrictions,37
and families in public housing typically face a bar on housing family
members with criminal records.38 Cammett argues that, in these and other
ways, the government makes it harder for low-income families, especially
low-income African Americans, who are disproportionately burdened by
the criminal justice system, to be together as a family.39 Her article
demonstrates that the civil collateral consequences of criminal convictions
place constraints on family integrity that should not be overlooked.
Other contributions to this symposium consider the particular framing
deployed in Moore, asking whether an alternative way of conceptualizing
the issues presented in the case would better reflect the realities of family
life or surface issues otherwise obscured by standard accounts of familial
rights. June Carbone and Naomi Cahn lament the Moore plurality
opinion’s focus on tradition rather than autonomy, arguing that it provides
an inadequate basis for recognizing other nontraditional family forms.40
They also note that the opinion offers no foundation for a vision of family
30. See id. at 2661.
31. See generally DARIA ROITHMAYR, REPRODUCING RACISM: HOW EVERYDAY CHOICES
LOCK IN WHITE ADVANTAGE (2014) (exploring the concepts of locked-in segregation and
inequality).
32. See generally CLARE HUNTINGTON, FAILURE TO FLOURISH: HOW LAW UNDERMINES
FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS (2014).
33. See Solangel Maldonado, Sharing a House but Not a Household: Extended Families
and Exclusionary Zoning Forty Years After Moore, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 2641, 2645 (2017).
34. See id. at 2647–48.
35. See id. at 2648–49.
36. See Ann Cammett, Reflections on the Challenge of Inez Moore: Family Integrity in
the Wake of Mass Incarceration, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 2579, 2579–80 (2017).
37. See id. at 2583–84.
38. See id. at 2585–87.
39. See id. at 2580.
40. See June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, Moore’s Potential, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 2589,
2590 (2017).
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life that involves state support for families.41 Moore, they argue, casts Inez
Moore as a worthy individual but does not analyze or open an avenue for
addressing the economic, social, and racialized structures that created the
need for this grandmother to take in her grandchildren in the first place.42
Nancy Dowd similarly maintains that the Moore Court missed an
opportunity in conceptualizing the issues at the heart of the case.
Describing John Jr.’s rich connections to his grandmother Inez and other
family members, Dowd asks how the legal analysis in Moore would look if
the Court had taken children’s rights seriously.43 In doing so, she tells the
story of Moore from John Jr.’s perspective, delineating the potential
constitutional claims available to him.44 Further, she offers an alternative
strategy for addressing the race, gender, and economic inequalities that
children face that embraces structuralism and intersectionality.45 Dowd
persuasively argues that securing the developmental support and equality
necessary for children to thrive requires greater attention to the systems and
structures that inform the families, neighborhoods, and communities in
which they are embedded.46
Finally, the remaining articles in this symposium build out from Moore to
ask what it suggests for family forms that have become more prevalent in
the forty years since it was decided. In her article, Tonya Brito describes
the failure of our current legal system to acknowledge complex families.
As she explains, the dominant family form in low-income communities
today is that each parent has children by multiple partners—what
demographers call multiple-partner fertility.47 Noting how much such
families differ from Inez Moore’s family, Brito counsels against
“pathologizing” such families or “prodding them into conforming to
prescribed societal norms.”48 Instead, she urges legal approaches and
solutions that help to reduce, rather than exacerbate, inequality in this
context.49 In particular, Brito outlines potential changes in policies
pertaining to matters such as child support, assistance provided through
programs such as Temporary Assistance to Needy Families, and the Earned
Income Tax Credit that better respond to the realities of complex families.50
Holning Lau and Kevin Maillard each explore transformations in family
structure, diversity, and rights affecting the LGBT community. Lau offers a
comparative analysis of the different approaches that the United States and

41. See id.
42. See id. at 2591.
43. See Nancy E. Dowd, John Moore Jr.: Moore v. City of East Cleveland and
Children’s Constitutional Arguments, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 2603, 2603 (2017).
44. See id. at 2605–11.
45. See id. at 2604.
46. Id.
47. See Tonya L. Brito, Complex Kinship Networks in Fragile Families, 85 FORDHAM L.
REV. 2567, 2572–74 (2017).
48. Id. at 2577.
49. See id.
50. See id. at 2574–77.
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South Africa have taken to same-sex marriage.51 While supportive of the
outcome in the Supreme Court’s 2015 decision in Obergefell v. Hodges,52
he sees significant strengths in the judicial reasoning applied in the
Constitutional Court of South Africa’s decision in Minister of Home Affairs
v. Fourie.53 Lau argues that Fourie’s emphasis on the dignity inherent not
in the marriage itself but in choosing whether to enter into that institution
offers a more useful frame than the one provided in Obergefell.54 He also
notes that the South African system offers a range of options for
relationship recognition and, in so doing, points to productive solutions that
other countries debating relationship recognition measures, including the
United States, could explore.55
Last, in his article, Kevin Maillard considers the meaning of maternal
rights in a world in which assisted reproductive technologies make it
possible for lesbian partners to each claim the status of mother.56 Upon
examining judicial decisions and statutory provisions addressing multiple
maternity and the rights of former partners to a child or children to whom
both have made significant contributions—whether through birth, genetics,
or caregiving—he observes that the definitions of parenthood, and
maternity in particular, have not kept pace with transformations in family
structure and diversity.57 To address this problem and the negative impact
that it has on nonbiological mothers in custody disputes, he imagines an
alternative approach to the “troubling gap between the assertion of
fundamental rights and equitable claims to parenthood” that arises in this
area.58 Rather than using a model of parental rights that prioritizes genetic
connection, he advocates legal changes that better respond to the concerns
of such “newly normative families.”59
Together, the articles assembled in this symposium underscore the value
of Moore as a subject of study for family law scholars and others concerned
about the functioning of modern families. The judgment that Inez Moore
won to protect her grandson forty years ago was, in many ways, the tip of
the iceberg. It raises important questions about the mechanisms and
support necessary to secure effective family functioning, while also
surfacing issues that have either too often been overlooked in family law
scholarship or that have only just emerged with recent changes in family
form and diversity. We hope that these articles convince readers of this
issue of the need for even “Moore kinship” studies.

51. See Holning Lau, Marriage Equality and Family Diversity:
Comparative
Perspectives from the United States and South Africa, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 2615, 2615
(2017).
52. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
53. 2006 (1) SA 524 (CC) (S. Afr.); see Lau, supra note 51, at 2617.
54. See Lau, supra note 51, at 2617.
55. See id. at 2622–24.
56. See Kevin Maillard, Other Mothers, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 2629, 2631 (2017).
57. See id. at 2631–2639.
58. Id. at 2632.
59. Id. at 2640.

